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cooperation literature, of the emancipatory potential historically associated with South–South 
cooperation. By drawing on the interventionist South–South cooperation agendas of ‘left’-leaning Latin 
America-Caribbean governments, the article seeks to establish a dialogue between social science 
theories and less ‘visible’ analyses from academic (semi)peripheries. The ten theses culminate in an 
exploration of the potential of South–South cooperation to promote ‘alternative’ development. 
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Based on a review of past and present academic South–South cooperation literatures, 
this article advances ten theses that problematise empirical, theoretical, conceptual 
and methodological issues essential to discussions of South–South cooperation in the 
twenty-first century.1 This endeavour is motivated by a perceived undermining of the 
emancipatory potential historically associated with South–South cooperation 
(especially though not exclusively) by Anglophone academia. In reclaiming this, I 
schematically draw from the interventionist (proactive) South–South cooperation 
agendas of ‘left’-leaning Latin America-Caribbean governments, including those of 
the Argentine Republic, Federative Republic of Brazil, Republic of Cuba, Republic of 
Ecuador, Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
These policies and practices embody a reinvigoration of South–South cooperation as 																																																								
1 Throughout the article ‘cooperation’ denotes partnerships that involve or are facilitated by so-called 
‘(re)emerging’, ‘new’, or ‘non-traditional’ actors not pertaining to the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). 
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‘Third World’ emancipation and liberation, while having been ‘upscaled’ from the 
international (bi/multilateral) to the regional. That is, South–South cooperation has 
over the past two decades become a constituent element of such regionalisms as the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples’ Trade Agreement 
(ALBA-TCP) and its sub-regionalist initiative Petrocaribe, the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), and the Union of 
South American Nations (UNASUR). Following a series of meetings and summits in 
the respective fora between February 2012 and August 2015 these processes have 
culminated in the declared intention of establishing ‘complementary economic zones’ 
among the 24 ALBA-TCP/Petrocaribe/CARICOM and among the 28 ALBA-
TCP/Petrocaribe/CARICOM/MERCOSUR member states. While not in existence as 
yet, however, these zones are to be governed by the South–South cooperation 
principles of ‘complementation’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘solidarity’, as established in the 
Group of 77 (G77) Charter of Algiers of 1967.2 With the exception of the Federative 
Republic of Brazil’s official South–South cooperation in the context of the so-called 
‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), these Latin America–Caribbean 
initiatives are underrepresented in the Anglophone academic South–South 
cooperation literature.3 However, they contribute considerably to conceptualising and 
theorising South–South cooperation in the 21st century. 
Some caveats should be noted. First, ‘thesis’ here denotes ‘a proposition to be 
maintained or proved’.4 As analytical statements, formulating the literature-based 
theses is a methodological device for categorised generalisation, at times perhaps 
adopting a more axiomatic tone. Second, while the issues raised – absences, 
reductions, normalisations – emerged with frequency from the literature review, the 
analysis makes no claims to representativeness or completeness. Third, and equally, 
no claims are made that all the issues raised are per se new (see, eg, Thesis One, 
Thesis Five). Rather, the theses structure a dialogue between social science theories 
and less ‘visible’ analyses from academic (semi)peripheries, especially the Latin 
America-Caribbean (in accordance with the empirical focus). Therefore, an inherent 
objective of this article is to counter the Western-centric bias in the production of 
knowledge about South–South cooperation, which I view as partially responsible for 
some of the limitations problematised in this article. After all, measured in terms of 
publications listed in the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), between 1998 and 																																																								
2 ALBA-TCP, Declaración Final; and MERCOSUR, Declaración Conjunta. For a comprehensive 
overview from the South of the national Latin America–Caribbean South–South cooperation agendas, 
see the edited volume by Ayllón and Ojeda, La Cooperación Sur–Sur. For an overview of regionalist 
Latin America–Caribbean South–South cooperation agendas, see Ayllón et al., Cooperación Sur–Sur. 
On Cuba–CARICOM, see Byron, “A New Era”; Cotman, “The Havana Consensus”; and Laguardia 
Martínez, “Las Relaciones Cuba–CARICOM.” On MERCOSUR transformation, see Briceño Ruiz, 
“New Left Governments.” For a systematic exploration of the convergence of the ALBA-
TCP/Petrocaribe, CARICOM and MERCOSUR South–South cooperation agendas, see Muhr, “The 
ALBA-TCP.” The commitment to South–South cooperation in regionalist projects is stated in many 
publicly released documents, including ALBA-TCP, Declaración Final; CARICOM, Declaración de 
La Habana; MERCOSUR, Informe; and UNASUR, South American Union of Nations. 
3 I use ‘Anglophone South–South cooperation literature’ to refer to academic literature that is explicitly 
framed by South–South cooperation and/or development cooperation generally, mostly by reference to 
development cooperation in the title. This excludes material that takes as its object of analysis 
particular cases, such as Cuban, Venezuelan or ALBA-TCP cooperation. (Such examples include 
Domínguez, To Make a World; Hickling-Hudson et al., “The Cuban Revolution”; and Muhr, Counter-
globalization and Socialism. 
4 Oxford English Reference Dictionary, 1498. 
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2007, 90.2% of academic publications worldwide were produced in Europe and the 
USA.5 While these figures are only indicative, however, as Mu and Pereyra-Rojas 
remind us, scholars such as Edward Said have shown ‘that the representation of the 
Orient by the scholarly communities of the “Enlightenment” in the West constituted a 
biased view suitable to their own interests’.6 Conceptually ‘West’/‘North’, however, 
also includes members of global academic elites in territories of the geographical 
South who may publish also in languages other than English (and, conversely, 
knowledge from the South can be produced in territories of the North, as this article 
seeks to underscore – see Thesis Eight).7 Fourth, as a ‘critical’ rather than ‘problem-
solving’ effort,8 this article is neither about evaluating or comparing specific South–
South cooperation policies and practices, nor about exhaustively exploring individual 
dimensions thereof. Rather, the distinct though complementary – at times perhaps 
contradictory – theses culminate in an exploration of the potential of South–South 
cooperation to promote ‘alternative’ development. 
 
Thesis One: reduction to ‘rhetoric’ serves dismissive labelling; discourse is 
a co-constitutive moment of social transformation 
Expressed commitment to South–South cooperation, especially with respect to 
‘solidarity’, from such governments as those of Brazil and of the other BRICS 
members is frequently dubbed ‘rhetoric’.9 While this may be associated with 
‘effective or persuasive speaking or writing’,10 ‘rhetoric’ equally connotes 
‘exaggeration’ and ‘insincerity’,11 perhaps vacuousness and even ‘irrationality’.12 
Inherently political, this atheoretical label sweepingly discredits governments (and/or 
sectors thereof) that may actually be seeking a transformation of the global power 
geographies towards a more democratic, multipolar world order, against the 
(historical) structural constraints within which they are operating. 
In contrast, as is widely recognised across the (critical) social sciences, discourse, 
characterised as ‘structured totalities articulating both linguistic and non-linguistic 
elements’,13 offers a more socio-theoretically grounded approach to language and 
social transformation. Specifically, in foregrounding the socially constructionist effect 
of discourse, David Harvey proposes to understand this as one of six co-constitutive, 
dialectically related moments of the social process, as South–South cooperation is, 
besides, social relations; material practices; institutions/rituals; beliefs/values/desires; 																																																								
5 UNESCO, World Social Science Report, Table 4.2. 
6 Mu and Pereyra-Rojas, “Impact on Society,” 217. 
7 On such notions as ‘sociology of absences’, ‘epistemicide’ and hegemonic forms of knowledge 
production generally (‘theory mills of the North’), see Dale and Robertson, “Interview”; and 
Appadurai, “Grassroots Globalization.” 
8 Cox, “Social Forces.” 
9 For example, Bond, “Sub-imperialism”; Campling, “A Critical Political Economy,” 258; Gray and 
Murphy, “Introduction”; Inoue and Vaz, “Brazil as ‘Southern Donor’”; Jenkins, “Latin America and 
China”; Kragelund, “The Return of Non-DAC Donors,” 572; Nel and Taylor, “Bugger thy 
Neighbour?”; and Quadir, “Rising Donors,” 335. 
10 Oxford English Reference Dictionary, 1235. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Laclau, On Populist Reason, 12. 
13 Laclau, On Populist Reason, 13. 
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and power.14 While this is not the place for a discussion of the interrelatedness of 
discourse, power and ideology,15 language, as a social practice, is involved in naming 
and producing the worlds that we inhabit, in (re)producing ways of seeing, doing, 
being and imagining. Thus, social relations and, therefore, social realities are also 
discursively (re)produced and interests strategically promoted. For example, the 
neoliberal discourse has driven the reconstitution of imaginaries and subjectivities 
sometimes even before its operationalisation changed the material world – ‘things’, 
such as institutions, cities, states and regionalisms, as well as regimes and structures.16 
The materialisation of the ‘BRICS’ grouping itself illustrates the ‘power of 
discourse’: BRICS has gone from being originally a discursive construal to holding 
regular meetings and the establishment of a development bank in 2014, the New 
Development Bank BRICS (NDB BRICS).17 
Through the discursive moment of South–South cooperation, which involves, inter 
alia, the principles of ‘solidarity’, ‘complementarity’ and ‘cooperation’, counter-
hegemonic mental conceptions of the world become disseminated, seeking to 
denaturalise and destabilise hegemonic representations, that is, taken-as-given, 
implicit and commonsensical propositions, assumptions and stereotypes that appear as 
non-ideological because of their dissociation from the particular social base (class, 
grouping) and interests which generated them.18 Rather than simply ‘rhetoric’, as 
Ernesto Laclau elaborates, discursive production is about constructing collective 
identities indispensable for transformative political action.19 
 
Thesis Two: there are key global South–South cooperation protagonists 
beyond BRICS 
The Anglophone academic South–South cooperation literature of the past 10–15 years 
is biased towards BRICS and individual members thereof, while such formations as 
IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) 
have received some attention. Other global actors, such as the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, are marginalised, if not omitted.20 
However, in 2006 the shares of Saudi Arabian and Venezuelan South–South 
development cooperation globally were estimated at 40% and 18%, respectively, as 
compared to China (14%), India (4.1%), Brazil (2.6%) and South Africa (1.4%).21  																																																								
14 Harvey, Justice. 
15 For an overview, see Howarth, “Power.” 
16 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, 13. 
17 The invention of the acronym BRICS (originally BRIC) is ascribed to an article published by 
Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill in 2001. See 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/ourthinking/archive/building-better.html. 
18 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, 30–39; and Angosto-Ferrández, “Ordering Discontent.” 
19 Laclau, Populist Reason. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this aspect 
and for pointing to the role of (partially) ‘empty signifiers’ in discursive production. 
20 Notable exceptions, however, do exist. For example, both Venezuelan and Saudi Arabian South–
South cooperation are quite comprehensively discussed in Mawdsley, From Recipients to Donors and 
these also receive some attention in such edited volumes as Chaturvedi et al., Development 
Cooperation; and Dargin, The Rise of the Global South (one contribution of which is dedicated to the 
Gulf States). The bias appears more pronounced in leading (eg SSCI listed) academic journals. 
21 Reality of Aid Management Committee, “South–South Cooperation,” Table 1. 
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Measured in estimated percentage of gross national income (GNI), the Venezuelan 
(0.71–1.52%) and Saudi Arabian (0.70%) allocations were significantly higher than 
those of India (0.06–0.11%), China (0.06–0.08%), South Africa (0.07%) and Brazil 
(0.04%).22 Also in 2006, in absolute terms, the Venezuelan volume was estimated at 
US$1166 and the Saudi Arabian at $2095 million, roughly matching the Chinese 
volume of $2172 million and significantly higher than the Indian ($433 million), 
Brazilian ($365 million) and South African ($100 million).23 These figures, compiled 
from a range of different sources, are only indicative, however, and they are outdated. 
Definitional inconsistencies and the frequent unavailability of data, combined with 
methodological and technical limitations, make more precise calculations difficult.24 
Nonetheless, the prominence given to BRICS members Brazil, India and South Africa 
in the Anglophone academic literature, certainly over the 2000s, was never 
empirically justified and may have been geopolitically motivated in accordance with 
Western/Northern interests. 
 
Thesis Three: South–South cooperation as Third World emancipation has 
been reinvigorated in Latin America-Caribbean 
Michelle Morais de Sá e Silva usefully distinguishes between three historical phases 
in the evolution of South–South cooperation since World War II: (1) ‘self-reliance 
and political strengthening’ (1949–79) during cold war decolonisation and 
independence struggles; (2) ‘demobilisation’ (1980–98) during the West’s neoliberal 
counter-offensive; and (3) South–South cooperation as ‘best practice transfer’ among 
developing countries. The latter is associated with the World Bank’s creation of the 
Global Development Network in 1999 and the emergence of North–South–South 
triangular collaboration, in which international agencies and Northern governments 
act as ‘brokers’, turning South–South cooperation into an instrument of neoliberal 
‘efficiency’ and performance enhancement.25 This discursive accommodation, and re-
conceptualisation of South–South cooperation as ‘transfer’ rather than ‘collective 
process’, undermines the ‘organic, political and potentially innovative nature of 
South–South cooperation...While some cooperative efforts engender transfer [eg 
technology transfer], transfer does not necessarily engender cooperation. Cooperation 
is a voluntary process whilst transfer includes voluntary and coercive processes.’26 
The advocacy of ‘best practice transfer’, however, has in Latin America-Caribbean 
been accompanied by a reinvigoration, or re-intensification, of South–South 
cooperation as Third World emancipation and liberation.27 Grounded in the decade-
long protagonism of Cuban developmental internationalism, key moments in this 
were the Cuban Revolution’s launch of the Integral Health Programme for Central 
America and the Caribbean within the context of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 
(subsequently extended to African and Asian nations28), followed by the inauguration 																																																								
22 ECOSOC, Background Study, Table 2. 
23 ECOSOC, Background Study, Table 3.1. 
24 ECOSOC, Background Study, 10. 
25 de Sá e Silva, “South–South Cooperation.” 
26 Jules and de Sá e Silva, “How Different Disciplines,” 58 (emphasis in the original). 
27 de Sá e Silva, “South–South Cooperation.” 
28 PNUD, Investigación sobre Ciencia. 
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of the Latin American School of Medicine (Escuela Latinoamericana de Medicina, 
ELAM) and of the International School of Physical Education and Sports (Escuela 
Internacional de Educación Físisca y Deporte, EIEFD) in 1999 and 2001, 
respectively. Importantly, while the economic crisis following the collapse of the 
USSR forced the Cuban government to reduce its humanist (altruistic) cooperation 
during the first half of the 1990s, this commitment was never abandoned.29 
Simultaneously, with Hugo Chávez assuming the presidency of Venezuela in 1999, 
the 1970s project of a ‘New International Economic Order’ was resumed alongside 
calls for a multipolar world order.30 Accordingly the Cuba–Venezuela Integral 
Cooperation Agreement of October 2000 initiated the construction of the ALBATCP, 
which became formalised by presidents Fidel Castro and Chávez in December 2004 
(composed of 11 states in 2015), followed by the creation of Petrocaribe in June 2005 
(19 member states in 2015). In the respective discourses the South–South cooperation 
principles are defined thus: solidarity, being ‘The commitment to mutual support and 
joint efforts to achieve sustainable and integral human development, and the 
appropriate care of countries’ emergent needs, within the possibilities and in 
accordance with shared responsibilities’; complementarity, being ‘The commitment to 
identify and develop joint projects that permit the integration and/or synergies of the 
capacities in accordance with their [partners’] potentialities and interests’; and 
cooperation, being ‘strategic alliances of mutual benefit’.31 South–South cooperation 
has thus been ‘upscaled’ in Latin America-Caribbean (from the international to the 
regional) as an idea, social practice and multidimensional set of processes. Grounded 
in dependency theory, it may be defined thus: as more horizontal (egalitarian and just, 
at times–but not necessarily–altruistic) diplomatic, trade, aid and investment relations 
of mutual benefit and for national and collective self-reliance, self-determination and 
independence, to liberate the (semi-)periphery from the exploitative, unequal terms of 
trade with the core, while strengthening its political autonomy within the 
(neo)colonial and imperialist global system.32 Such relations and exchanges include: 
agriculture, culture, economy, education, energy, environment, finance, food, health, 
infrastructure, knowledge, law, military, production (value adding capacities), social 
protection, technology and humanitarian issues. 
Latin America–Caribbean South–South cooperation extends to the global and 
intercontinental scales, however. For example, the Africa South America (ASA) 
Summits, which involve the 12 UNASUR member states and the 54 African states, 
led to the establishment in 2009 of a Permanent ASA Secretariat on Isla Margarita 
(Venezuela), as well as a Strategic Presidential Table, then composed of four 
coordinating governments (Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, Libya) and the regional 
representatives of the African Union and of UNASUR.33 As the 2006 Joint 
Declaration between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Republic of Mali 																																																								
29 De Vos et al., “Cuba’s International Cooperation”; and Hickling-Hudson et al., “The Cuban 
Revolution.” 
30 Chávez Frías, La Propuesta; Chávez Frías, “Speech”; and República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 
Líneas Generales. 
31 Muhr, “TINA go Home,” Table 1. 
32 By reference to, inter alia, Chaturvedi, “Development Cooperation”; Golub, “From the New 
International Economic Order”; Higginbottom, “The Political Economy”; Lengyel and Malacalza, 
“What do we Talk?”; Mawdsley, From Recipients to Donors, 48–65; Nyerere, Unity, 4; United 
Nations, Declaration; and UNDP, Buenos Aires Plan of Action. 
33 Giacchi, “La Política exterior,” 49–50. 
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suggests, the different South–South initiatives and actors involved may indeed 
cooperate and complement rather than compete with each other: 
Within the framework of strengthening South–South cooperation, and especially the cooperation 
between Africa and South America, the two Parties welcomed the initiatives by Brazil and Nigeria to 
celebrate the First African–South American Summit in Abuja, Nigeria...Equally, the Malian Party 
welcomed the proposals made by President Hugo Chávez Frías during the VII Summit of the African 
Union realised in Banjul, 1 and 2 of July 2006, with respect to the implementation of South–South 
cooperation via concrete programmes such as Petrosur, Telesur, Bank of the South and the University 
of the South.34 
The cooperative potential among major Southern actors is further mirrored in growing 
triangular South–South–South cooperation practiced among the governments of 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, Iran, Russia and Venezuela with African partners.35 
 
Thesis Four: solidarity and interests are not per se mutually exclusive 
Emma Mawdsley warns that Southern actors may ‘conceal national interests under the 
veil of solidarity’.36 While this possibility may exist, it should equally be highlighted 
that, far from concealing, governments such as those of Brazil and Venezuela make 
the existence of ‘national interests’ explicit,37 as does the definition of 
‘complementarity’ stated in Thesis Three (‘integration and/or synergies of the 
capacities in accordance with their [partners’] potentialities and interests ’, emphasis 
added). In more conceptual terms, the above statement bears the implicit assumption 
of a mutual exclusiveness of commercial (trade) interests and solidarity, while 
treating solidarity as synonymous with altruism.38 That this should not be generalised 
is shown by the definition of ‘solidarity’ among the 21 ALBA-TCP/Petrocaribe 
member states and of bilateral cooperation among Venezuelan, Argentine, Brazilian, 
Uruguayan and African partners, among others. As cited in Thesis Three, solidarity is 
the ‘commitment to mutual support and joint efforts to achieve sustainable and 
integral human development, and the appropriate care of countries’ emergent needs, 
within the possibilities and in accordance with shared responsibilities’. It is 
noteworthy that even the Cuban Revolution, historically perhaps the most prominent 
protagonist of South–South solidarity, has always reconciled altruism with 
commercial and political or ideological interests.39 Accordingly such governments as 
the Brazilian and Venezuelan have also officially distinguished in their approaches to 
South–South cooperation between a commercial (trade, finance and technology 
transfer) dimension in the interest of socioeconomic development within their 
territories (‘national interest’) and altruistic cooperation (donations, grants or in-kind) 
in the interests of partner societies’ development (agriculture, food security and food 
																																																								
34 Government of Venezuela/Government of Mali, “Comunicado Conjunto.” 
35 Forite, “Entre rupturas”; Giacchi, “La Política exterior”; Inoue and Vaz, “Brazil as ‘Southern 
Donor’”; and Lucena Molero, “La agenda.” 
36 Mawdsley, “The Changing Geographies,” 268. 
37 For example, Brazilian Cooperation Agency, “CGPD”; and República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 
Líneas Generales. 
38 Inoue and Vaz, “Brazil as ‘Southern Donor’”; and Mawdsley, “The Changing Geographies,” 263. 
39 Domínguez, To Make a World; Erisman, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place.” 
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sovereignty; debt cancellation; education; energy sovereignty; health; social 
protection; technology; sport).40 
Four observations need highlighting here: first, as Monika Sawicka argues with 
respect to official Brazilian–African relations, ‘main trade partners and main 
development beneficiaries are not the same’.41 This insight weakens the blanket 
assumption of commercial exploitation on the part of (for instance) Brazilian 
corporations under the guise of South–South altruism. Second, trade and altruism can 
be complementary and mutually reinforcing and reciprocal benefits may be generated 
that cannot always be expressed in quantifiable monetary terms, such as with respect 
to experience, knowledge and cultural exchange, capacity building, diplomatic 
solidarity, human rights promotion, and the visibility and recognition of the South 
generally.42 After all, how may, for instance, solidarity voting behaviour in 
international fora (eg the UN) be monetarily quantified? Or, in accordance with Peter 
Kragelund’s findings, how can strengthened national sovereignty, and independence 
from traditional Northern donors thanks to the availability of alternative development 
finance from Chinese, Indian and Brazilian partners, be grasped in monetary terms?43 
Assessment of South–South cooperation, therefore, faces the methodological 
challenge of capturing its holism and multidimensionality: reducing South–South 
cooperation to single ‘variables’, such as the economic (usually itself reduced to trade 
and investment figures), is inappropriate. Attempting to measure South–South 
cooperation may in fact be a futile enterprise altogether. As has been observed with 
respect to the ALBA-TCP, ‘While critics have noted the difficulties involved in 
quantitatively measuring the ‘value’ of such transactions, the whole point of the 
model is to move beyond the mediation of trade through capital exchange’.44 
Third, while South–South trade may indeed reproduce global structures of 
inequality,45 the precise terms of trade need to be explored in each case. For example, 
if, as in the ALBATCP/Petrocaribe, Venezuelan petroleum is exchanged for services 
and goods (eg Cuban medical staff, Dominican language teachers, Nicaraguan 
primary food stuff s) within a concessional financing scheme and with governments 
enjoying the ‘flexibility to negotiate the terms of their participation which are 
appropriate to their [nations’] idiosyncrasies’,46 then South–South trade as a 
reciprocal relation of mutual benefit (in both parties’ interests, while ‘taking into 
account the asymmetries between the Parties’ – see Thesis Three) among equals 
materialises, even if one party accumulates profit. After all, depending on the 
partner’s economic situation, even the Cuban government has charged (variable) 
commercial rates for services, albeit below world market prices, thus generating the 																																																								
40 As discussed in Abdenur, “The Strategic Triad”; Angosto-Ferrández, “Ordering Discontent”; Benzi 
and Zapata, “Geopolítica”; Giacchi, “La Política exterior”; Inoue and Vaz, “Brazil as ‘Southern 
Donor’”; Kragelund, “‘Donors go Home’,” 152–153; Santos Pinho, “Cooperación Sur–Sur”; and 
Sawicka, “An Emerging Voice.” 
41 Sawicka, “An Emerging Voice,” 19. 
42 Dauvergne and Farias, “The Rise of Brazil”; Domínguez, To Make a World; Erisman, “Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place”; Forite, “Entre rupturas”; Inoue and Vaz, “Brazil as ‘Southern Donor’”; 
Lucena Molero, “La agenda”; Ojeda, “La cooperación Sur–Sur”; and Santos Pinho, “Cooperación Sur–
Sur.” 
43 Kragelund, “‘Donors go Home’.” 
44 Broadhead and Morrison, “‘Peace based on Social Justice’,” 14. 
45 Nel and Taylor, “Bugger thy Neighbour?” 
46 Girvan, “Is ALBA a New Model?,” 165. 
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‘win-win’ relationship with which South–South cooperation is frequently 
associated.47 Fourth, private surplus value appropriation may not only be inevitable in 
the current social reality of most nations but is also politically necessary to counter 
resistance by elite sectors and thus make South–South cooperation less vulnerable to 
government change. As Inoue and Vaz sum up, ‘national interest’ and solidarity, even 
if narrowly understood as altruism, ‘are not necessarily mutually exclusive’.48 
 
Thesis Five: ‘the national interest’ is an inadequate ontological category 
The notion of ‘the national interest’, however, is problematic in itself. Criticisms of, 
say, a particular BRICS country pursuing ‘its’ interest,49 are ontologically flawed: 
states and societies, as (critical) social science has maintained, are not homogeneous, 
unified, monolithic subjects that act in ‘the national interest’, but are constituted 
through social relations that imply class struggle related to distinct class interests.50 
Social groups, classes, class fractions and the components that make up the state 
apparatus thus may be in conflict and act relatively autonomously with or against each 
other. Transforming world order through South–South cooperation, as Mahbub ul 
Haq states, is not only a slow and long-term political process, but one that involves 
struggle, inextricably linked to a fundamental restructuring of Third World societies 
through a ‘countervailing power’ organised on a ‘political, economic and intellectual 
front’.51 That is, the construction of a Gramscian counter-hegemonic bloc. 
While states (state apparatuses) in the capitalist core at this historical conjuncture may 
appear unitary and largely free from class conflict, in the peripheral and semi-
peripheral nations of Latin America-Caribbean the struggle over the form of the state 
and national, regional and global development projects – including South–South 
cooperation – is overt. This class struggle has been manifest in political, military, 
economic and media-related transnational capitalist class destabilisation and in 
successful and attempted coups d’état against constitutional governments – Venezuela 
(2002), Haiti (2004), Honduras (2009), Ecuador (2010), Paraguay (2012, a 
‘parliamentary’ coup) – that drive societal restructuring in the interests of the 
historically marginalised and dispossessed classes. Class struggle within the Brazilian 
state apparatus, for example, became overt in former president Lula da Silva 
supporting the Venezuelan adhesion to MERCOSUR throughout 2006–09, blocked, 
however, during this period by the Federal Senate, despite ratification in the Chamber 
of Deputies. Accordingly South–South cooperation, that is, its particular form, ‘is also 
driven by differing domestic sectoral interest, as well as by the interests of competing 
political parties and bureaucratic organizations’.52 The policy outcomes, as with 
respect to South–South cooperation, obviously depend on the particular power 																																																								
47 Domínguez, To Make a World; Erisman, “Cuban Development Aid”; and Hickling-Hudson et al., 
“The Cuban Revolution.” 
48 Inoue and Vaz, “Brazil as ‘Southern Donor’,” 531 (emphasis in the original). 
49 For example, Quadir, “Rising Donors,” esp. 333. Mawdsley, “The Changing Geographies,” 266 
raises this issue without, however, discussing its methodological implications. 
50 For example, Jessop, “Nicos Poulantzas”; Jessop, State Power; and Poulantzas, State, Power, 
Socialism. 
51 ul Haq, “Beyond the Slogan,” 744. 
52 Inoue and Vaz, “Brazil as ‘Southern Donor’,” 528. 
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relations in the distinct national state–society complexes. However, these dialectics 
cannot be delinked from such struggles at the transnational, regional and global scales 
(see Theses Eight and Nine).53 A class analysis that accounts for competing class-
related interests is indispensable for understanding constraints, apparent 
inconsistencies and contradictions in such national policies as South–South 
cooperation. 
 
Thesis Six: South–South cooperation is principally about 
interdependences, not ‘new dependencies’ 
Claims of South–South cooperation creating ‘new dependencies’ and aggravating the 
(re)indebtedness of impoverished nations has in the absence of conclusive evidence 
been dismissed as little more than ideologically driven propaganda.54 Beyond the 
empirical, of theoretical interest in this respect is the difference between ‘dependency’ 
and ‘dependence’ as two distinct relations of inequality: while dependency implies 
‘the absence of actor autonomy’, that is, the subjection and conditioning of 
(semi)peripheral economies to the interests of transnational capital (systemic value 
transfer to the ‘core’), dependence  connotes ‘asymmetric interdependence’ which, 
however, can be legitimate if consensual.55 As ‘total self-reliance’ for resource-poor 
nations appears unachievable, ‘controlled dependence’ is a ‘counter-dependency’ 
relationship in which the partners can ‘affect the fundamental nature of their 
relationships’, despite the existing power asymmetries in interdependent 
relationships.56 
The Venezuelan government’s energy security cooperation provides an apt example 
of such counter-dependency politics. This dimension of South–South cooperation 
reduces the ‘fracture’ between energy producers and consumers in the South, 
identified as a structural impediment to Third World unity in the 1970s.57 Rather than 
obfuscating inevitable asymmetries, the principle of reciprocity (see Thesis Three) 
explicitly recognises such unequal ‘power geometries’ as a prerequisite for 
emancipatory political action, that is, to transform them.58 Rather than (re)producing 
dependency, Southern interdependences drive global structural transformation. 
 
Thesis Seven: Southern homogeneity is a false expectation 
As fragmentation has been regarded to have contributed to the defeat of Third World 
emancipation in the cold war era, it has been suggested that growing heterogeneity 																																																								
53 For studies of such struggles by forces from both the ‘left’ and the ‘right’, see Angosto-Ferrández, 
Reframing Venezuela; Cannon, “As Clear as MUD”; Duffy, “(Re)conceptualising Democracy”; and 
Fuentes, “‘Bad Left Government’.” 
54 See Woods, “Whose Aid?,” largely informed by Chinese official cooperation. Kragelund, “‘Donors 
go Home’,” provides similar arguments based on a Zambian case study. 
55 Caporaso, “Dependence, Dependency, and Power,” 18. 
56 Erisman, “Cuban Development Aid,” 143. 
57 Golub, “From the New International Economic Order,” 1005–1006. 
58 Massey, “Concepts of Space and Power.” 
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among Southern actors may further have eroded the potential for ‘progressive’ global 
transformation.59 While this may be true, little is gained by stating the obvious, unless 
it encourages constructive exploration of how to reconcile South–South cooperation 
with the reality of heterogeneity. Historically key exponents of South–South 
cooperation, such as Julius Nyerere, made no pretence of ideological/political, 
economic, social and cultural heterogeneity within the South, proposing to 
concentrate on mutual interests.60 Against this backdrop ul Haq warned that a ‘global 
and “idealized”’ approach to South–South cooperation may be counter- productive, 
implying that, under certain circumstances, concentrating on specific areas and 
operational scales, such as the regional and sub-regional, might be more effective.61 
This in fact can be observed in Latin America-Caribbean, where such processes and 
relations have culminated in the declared intention of creating the ALBA-
TCP/Petrocaribe–CARICOM–MERCOSUR ‘Complementary Economic Zone’. In 
these projects, especially the ALBA-TCP/Petrocaribe, which is ideologically the most 
explicit, strategic and institutionalised South–South cooperation project at the 
moment, Nyerere’s and ul Haq’s calls for the creation of Third World multinational 
corporations and jointly owned industries, media enterprises, shipping lines, 
institutions of research and development, and financial clearing institutions,62 have 
materialised at the regional and global scales as expressions of synergies generated 
through common interests.63 Rather than dwelling on the litany of heterogeneity, 
analysing how this is exploited by Northern/Western imperial social and political 
forces and developing counter- strategies may be a more productive contribution to 
global democratic transformation. 
 
Thesis Eight: South–South cooperation involves transnationalism and 
non-traditional non-state actors, which challenges mainstream uses of ‘the 
global South’ 
Rather than restricting the notion of South–South cooperation to inter-national (inter-
state) relations, twenty-first century South–South cooperation, while facilitated by 
governments, also involves non-state actors.64 While this is commonly associated 
with ‘civil society’(so-called NGOs and the private capitalist business sector), the 
reinvigorated South–South cooperation in Latin America-Caribbean involves the 
construction of ‘transnational organised society’. As a counter-hegemonic concept 
antithetical to liberal-bourgeois ‘civil society’, ‘organised society’ challenges the 
historical association of civil society with liberal individualism and a capitalist market 
society and means popular, mass-based organisation and the collective exercise of 
‘popular power’ through councils and movements in the construction of non-capitalist 
social relations.65 In other words, the dialectical sets of South–South cooperation 																																																								
59 See Campling, “A Critical Political Economy,” 262–263; Golub, “From the New International 
Economic Order”; Quadir, “Rising Donors”; Sridharan, “G-15 and South–South Cooperation,” 370–
171; and Toye, “Assessing the G-77.” 
60 Nyerere, Unity, 4. 
61 ul Haq, “Beyond the Slogan.” 
62 Nyerere, Unity, 9–10; and ul Haq, “Beyond the Slogan.” 
63 Aponte-García, El Nuevo Regionalismo; and Muhr, Counter-globalization and Socialism. 
64 For instance, de Sá e Silva, “South–South Cooperation,” 39. 
65 Muhr, “(Re)constructing Popular Power.” See also Angosto-Ferrández, Reframing Venezuela; and 
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relations (discourse, practice, institutionalisation) driven by politically like-minded, 
left-leaning Latin America-Caribbean state and government actors have involved 
cooperation with such popular movements as the Landless Workers Movement 
(Brazil) and so-called ‘recuperated factories’ (Uruguay). However, such transnational 
South–South cooperation relations extend to the global, including individuals, sectors 
and communities in territories of the North, eg the New York Bronx and other places 
in the USA as well as in Europe.66 Such rescaling of class struggle implies that such 
formerly relatively homogeneous neoliberal elite projects as MERCOSUR have 
become arenas of class struggle from which such struggle had hitherto largely been 
excluded. 
This bears implications for conceptualising the ‘global South’.67 In recent years the 
term ‘global South’ has been popularised in the sense of a geographic north–south 
binary, equivalent to the depiction of ‘the South’ on the well-known front cover of the 
1980 Brandt Report. However, as Linda Chisholm states, ‘belonging to the South is 
not defined by being located in the Southern Hemisphere’; rather, ‘the South’ is ‘a 
relational concept that invariably refers to a relationship of inequality’.68 This 
observation corresponds with Manuel Castell’s notion of the ‘Fourth World’ as a 
socio-geographic conception of exploitation, exclusion and deprivation: the 
coexistence of inter-country inequalities and dramatically increased intra-country 
inequalities at the global scale, ie the selective inclusion and exclusion of segments of 
societies across nation-states.69 While ‘the South’ evokes a state-centric inter-national 
ontology, the global South, as Luis Angosto-Ferrández suggests, can be viewed as a 
people-based concept, whereby a collective transnational political identity is produced 
through the shared experiences of exclusion, marginalisation, exploitation and 
disenfranchisement.70 As discussed (Thesis Five), this does not exclude from the 
analysis popular states and governments of the South that act in the (diverse and 
contradictory) interests of the people rather than transnational capital. The global 
South should thus be understood in socio-spatial terms, as the globalised South, which 
coexists with the globalised North within and across territories in both the 
geographical north and the south. This raises more substantive methodological issues, 
discussed below. 
 
These Nine: South–South cooperation facilitates the construction of a 
socialist counter-space 
The social relations, processes and inter-connectivities associated with South–South 
cooperation produce their own spatiality. Rather than absolute space (such as the 
bounded nation-state territory), relational space is constructed (and lived and 																																																																																																																																																														
Duffy, “(Re)conceptualising Democracy.” 
66 See, for example, the case studies in Muhr, Counter-globalization and Socialism; and Muhr, “South–
South Cooperation.” For a chronological mapping of cooperation documents in the 2000s, see Muhr, 
“Venezuela,” Appendix 12. 
67 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, South–South Educational Migration, 14; Muhr, Venezuela and the ALBA, 32–
33; and Werner, “Contesting Power/Knowledge.” 
68 Chisholm, “Introduction,” 3. 
69 Castells, End of Millennium. 
70 Angosto-Ferrández, “Ordering Discontent.” 
Thomas Muhr (2016) Third World Quarterly 37(4): 630-648 
doi: 10.1080/01436597.2015.1108161 
	 13	
changed) through a multiplicity of social practices or actions, including discourse;71 it 
is produced ‘across all spatial scales, from the global reach of finance and 
telecommunications, through the geography of the tentacles of national political 
power, to the social relations within the town, the settlement, the household and the 
workplace’.72 Space, therefore, is ‘imbued with power’ and ‘power in its turn always 
has a spatiality’.73 Political-sociologically, this means that the ‘struggle for (and in) 
space’ is an expression of class struggle.74 Subsequently a ‘simultaneous multiplicity 
of spaces’ means the interpenetration and superimposition of spaces upon one 
another.75 Therefore, while South–South cooperation is not per se an anti-capitalist 
project, it nonetheless produces a spatiality within which a socialist ‘counter-space’ (a 
socialist space produced by non-capitalist social relations) can be constructed.76 Even 
though the prevailing historical structure (global capitalism) is not necessarily directly 
challenged by South–South cooperation, even in part reproduced through, for 
instance, surplus value extraction and other exploitative practices, it is simultaneously 
resisted as an alternative configuration of forces – a rival structure or counter-
spatiality – is being produced.77 Consequently, while contemporary practices of 
South–South cooperation may be criticised for failing to pursue or achieve a ‘partial 
withdrawal or “de-linkage” from the global economy’,78 gradual structural 
transformation (a counter-hegemonic ‘pluri-scalar war of position’79) may be an 
alternative strategy in the contemporary global conjuncture of economic and military 
power. A socio-spatial analysis thus facilitates capturing the coexistence of different 
(though in reality intertwined) political economies within and across territories, that 
is, various forms of capitalism as well as an emerging socialist economy.80 Such 
parallel structures are manifest, for example, in the coexistence of capitalist 
multinational corporate and ALBA-TCP/Petrocaribe networks of petrol stations in, 
for instance, the territories of El Salvador, Nicaragua and the USA;81 in Venezuela the 
‘Communal Economic System’ is one of the coexisting political economies in that 
territory.82 
 
Thesis Ten, by way of conclusion: South–South cooperation cannot resolve 
all the world’s ‘ills’ – why should it (be expected to)? 
The theses presented in this article have in a cumulative, complementary and 
occasionally perhaps contradictory fashion problematised empirical, theoretical, 
conceptual and methodological limitations in the dominant Anglophone academic 
literature on contemporary South–South cooperation. This final, concluding thesis 
embeds some of the key arguments developed in order to explore the potential of 																																																								
71 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 12, 33; and Harvey, “Space as a Key Word.” 
72 Massey, Space, Place, and Gender, 4. 
73 Massey, “Concepts of Space and Power,” 19. 
74 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 56. 
75 Massey, Space, Place, and Gender, 3; and Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 86. 
76 Lefebvre, The Production of Space. 
77 Cf. Cox, “Social Forces.” 
78 Gray and Murphy, “Introduction,” 184. 
79 Muhr, Counter-globalization and Socialism. 
80 Yaffe, “Venezuela.” 
81 Muhr, “Counter-globalization and a Revolutionary Politics.” 
82 Yaffe, “Venezuela.” 
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South–South cooperation to promote ‘alternative’ development, which the actors 
involved in the construction of the Southern ‘counter-space’ (see Thesis Nine) 
associate with (some form of) eco-socialist development. I enter this brief discussion 
via the popular criticisms of BRICS and ALBA-TCP member states reproducing the 
dominant exploitative, resource-extractivist model. On this basis expressed 
commitment to South–South cooperation is frequently challenged as ‘rhetoric’ (see 
Thesis One) by ‘countries’ that are allegedly merely pursuing ‘their’ exploitative 
interests (see Theses Four and Five). As argued, such reasoning overlooks the 
complexities of national, trans- and international socio-political processes, as well as 
the possibility of relations of inter-dependence rather than dependency (see Theses 
Five and Six). Thus, the stated criticisms usually adopt a methodologically nationalist 
and voluntarist approach that ignores, first, the fact that global historical structures 
constrain action, and that the construction of a rival structure or counter-spatiality 
may inevitably involve the partial reproduction of the prevailing structures (see Thesis 
Nine); second, following from the former, the fact that resource extraction in a 
particular locality is dialectically intertwined with global patterns of consumption, 
consumerism and militarism; and, third, that the tension between social and 
environmental rights may be unresolvable.83  
However, I perceive a larger issue looming behind the stated criticisms: the implicit 
expectation that South–South cooperation should – and could – resolve all the world’s 
‘ills’ by offering a coherent alternative model of social organisation, one that would 
displace global capitalism and the hegemonic modernist development ideology per se. 
Indeed, while a ‘shared development vision’ may be absent among many Southern 
partners, including BRICS,84 calls for a common ‘organisational platform’,85  
necessary for South–South cooperation to effect global change, have tended to ignore 
the very creation of such institutions in Latin America-Caribbean. Within the 
rationales of ‘solidarity’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘complementary’, and such principles as 
‘fair’ trade to ‘reduce the economic asymmetries among the Parties’,86 these projects 
promote a counter-neoliberal development model, which may be a precondition for – 
but is far from – non-capitalist, environmentally and socially sustainable 
development. Importantly, rather than questioning development per se, as Richard 
Peet and Elaine Hartwick emphasise, to the dispossessed and exploited, excluded and 
disenfranchised, the question of what development may be of greater pertinence.87 
While economic growth as a key indicator of development persists within the Latin 
America-Caribbean socialist South–South cooperation ‘counter-space’ (Thesis Nine), 
hegemonic modernity is being challenged, particularly through the notion of el buen 
vivir/vivir bien  (the good living)88. Rooted in Andean indigenous knowledges,89 this 																																																								
83 For useful discussions on these issues, see Fuentes, “The Morales Government”; Fuentes, “‘Bad Left 
Government’”; Lalander, “Rights of Nature”; Lalander, “The Ecuadorian Resource Dilemma”; and 
McCarthy, “Political Ecology/Economy.” 
84 Cf. Quadir, “Rising Donors,” 332. 
85 Quadir, “Rising Donors,” 333. 
86 MERCOSUR, Declaración Conjunta. 
87 Cf. Peet and Hartwick, Theories of Development, 1–4, 236. 
88 I follow the Ecuadorean Government’s translation of el buen vivir as ‘the good living’ (Republic 
of Ecuador, 2010), rather than the perhaps more common translation as ‘living well’. In my 
understanding, the first, as a determiner phrase, connotes an absolute normative-philosophical 
and spiritual concept (a specific notion of what it means to live ‘the good life’), while the 
adjective ‘well’ is more relative in that it may suggest a satisfactory way of life, individually 
defined. 
Thomas Muhr (2016) Third World Quarterly 37(4): 630-648 
doi: 10.1080/01436597.2015.1108161 
	 15	
development ideal has discursively become integrated in bilateral cooperation 
agendas, such as the Brazilian–Venezuelan, as well as in national development plans 
(eg that of Nicaragua). As argued (Thesis One), discourse is one co-constitutive 
moment of social transformation. The creation of such ministries as the Ministry of 
Popular Power for Eco-socialism and Water (Ministerio de Poder Popular para el 
Ecosocialismo y Aguas, Venezuela) and the Ministry for Family, Communitarian, 
Cooperative and Associative Economy (Ministerio de Economía Familiar, 
Comunitaria, Cooperativa y Asociativa, Nicaragua), as well as the renewable energy 
security strategy within ALBA-TCP/Petrocaribe, are only a few instances of the 
efforts undertaken to realise such an eco-socialist development vision.90 As an 
example of a globalised localism,91 this ‘alternative’ philosophy has been integrated 
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